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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

9 May 82

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

SUBJECT:

NSSD 2/82

- 1. The DCI and I have reviewed NSSD 2/82 with the assistance of our staff and elements of the Intelligence Community in order to structure a procedure and outline for the conduct of the study. The study outline you requested is submitted as an attachment to this memorandum.
- 2. We have concluded that we cannot produce a quality study addressing all the items contained in NSSD 2/82 on the desired schedule. Accordingly, we have structured our response to deal with the problems sequentially, taking on the most critical needs first. The critical need at this juncture is for a review and identification of capabilities to detect and counter the foreign intelligence threat to the United States, to translate those required capabilities into meaningful resource levels, and to introduce the needed resources into an orderly program for successive budget actions. Inasmuch as a pattern already exists for this type of study and presentation, as in the "1985 Intelligence Capabilities Study," we will undertake this effort as a first phase of NSSD 2/82. This phase is planned for completion by 15 June 1982.
- 3. Other subjects identified for study in your Directive will be deferred until completion of the capabilities examination. We will then undertake additional studies as required to dispose of other valid issues which remain.
- 4. We will utilize the SIG-I as the principal steering group for the studies. Under the SIG-I, the IG/CI will function as the working group for study accomplishment. Individual departments and agencies participating in the IG/CI will utilize their staffs to provide inputs to the studies as appropriate. There probably will need to be some ad hoc membership augmentation of the IG/CI to accomplish the full range of study requirements.

B. R. INMÁN
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Attachments:

1. Study Outline for NSSD 2/82

2. Terms of Reference

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Attachment 1 to

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STUDY OUTLINE

- I. Scope the Threat
 - A. By Country
 - B. By Discipline
- II. Requirements for Response to the Threat
 - A. Overall U.S. Objectives
 - B. Detection, Collection, Investigation
 - C. Analysis and Assessment
 - D. Countermeasure Implementation
- III. Review of Resource Capabilities
 - A. Currently Existing
 - B. Programmed
 - C. Deficiencies
- IV. Needed Improvements in Capabilities
- V. Non-Resource Issues Which Impact on Needed Capabilities

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Attachment 2 to TS-820505

TERMS OF REFERENCE

In a 16 February 1982 National Security Study Directive, the President called for a comprehensive review of U.S. capabilities to detect, analyze, and counter the foreign intelligence threat to the United States and U.S. interests. As a companion study to the "1985 Intelligence Capabilities Study" submitted in October 1981, this effort also will focus on the 1985-1990 period. The study will serve as a blueprint for incremental augmenting of currently programmed intelligence and security capabilities as a guide for outyear funding. The study will be prepared under the leadership of the DCI with interagency support and participation for submission to the President. Issues requiring Presidential decision will be formulated as a draft NSDD.

The study will scope the anticipated foreign intelligence threat to the United States, make judgments over what portions of the threat must be dealt with, and will include a statement of objectives, identification of required capabilities, and prioritization of resource needs over the period. Capabilities to be identified and resources to be developed will include those in the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) as well as non-NFIP resources which contribute to detecting and countering the totality of the foreign intelligence threat.

Given the agreed scoping of the threat and judgments on portions to which the U.S. must respond, the study will examine detection, collection and investigative capabilities, analysis and assessment capabilities, and the capabilities to develop and implement a full range of countermeasures to the threat.

The study will examine the foregoing capabilities in at least ten areas of threat-countermeasure endeavor. These areas are: the HUMINT threat, the SIGINT threat, the Imagery threat, other technical threats, open source acquisitions, operational security, computer security, industrial security, personnel security, and physical security. Some of these examination areas may be combined, and others may be added as the study progresses.

Against these threat-countermeasure areas, we will identify and array all applicable capabilities and attendant resource levels now existing, programmed over the near-term, and those identified as deficiencies for which improvement action is required over the 1985-1990 period.

The organization to conduct this study will be the SIG-I as the executive steering committee and the IG/CI as the working group. Some augmentation of IG/CI membership will be required in order to involve all departments and agencies, particularly those outside the Intelligence Community, who have responsibilities in these areas. It is intended that each participating department or agency will draw from its own staff for development of inputs and position papers needed as contributions to the study. If additional or special staff requirements are needed, the SIG-I will provide guidance to the IG/CI.